THE OTHER SCENE PSYCHOANALYSIS AND ITS APPLICATIONS

The Work of Alfred Lorenzer

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Abstract: The work of Alfred Lorenzer (1922-2002), a German training analyst from Frankfurt, can be called the most important German post-war contribution to psychoanalysis in the 20th century. However, there is neither an introduction nor an English translation of his central works. This essay focuses on Lorenzer's view on the analytic process (scenical comprehension) and on his theory of socialisation (interactionforms, desymbolisation). It is argued, that his meta-theory of psychoanalysis delivers a conceptional framework to overcome the split into different traditions within psychoanalysis. Hidden links to kleinian thoughts are

traced and the concept of Transference as total situation (Joseph) is compared to Lorenzer's notion of scene and situation.

1. Introduction

Lorenzer, the man with the *Interpretation of Dreams* in the one hand and the *Capital* in the other hand, has not yet found his way to Britain. Although he has left an enormous oeuvre (König 1987), his work is not discussed in the English speaking world. It is the aim of this essay to give an introduction to the main parts of his work in order to show that a translation of his work is needed. It will be argued that his theory may serve as a frame of reference in overcoming the split into groups of contemporary Freudians, Independents and Kleinians.

Stemming from the philosophical tradition of the Frankfurt School (Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse, and, partly, Fromm) Lorenzer's contributions can be situated in the context of the dispute on neo-positivism, a discussion that affected all human sciences in former West-Germany during the late 1950ties and 1960ties (Adorno et al. 1969, Habermas 1968). His concept of 'scenical comprehension' was meant to overcome the dichotomy of explaining and understanding (Wright 1971) and to develop a third epistemological position in-between these two poles. His view on psychoanalysis was heavily informed by the central question the Frankfurt School discussed: How does the structure of society interact with the structure of personality and vice versa? Besides this theoretical orientation, Lorenzer referred for instance to Erikson and his study on the Sioux Indians in order to illustrate his theoretical claims (Erikson 1950; Lorenzer 1972a, 33-34). The reader will discover that Lorenzer's view goes beyond the so-called 'culturalists' like Fromm, for example.

Part two of this essay aims at a reconstruction of Lorenzer's line of argument: In trying to formulate an answer to the question 'What is the analyst doing during the session?' (ch. 2.1), Lorenzer discusses Loch's contributions and concludes that neither logical comprehension, i.e. explaining (ch. 2.2), nor empathy, i.e. understanding (ch. 2.3) can reach the unconscious. An examination of the psychoanalytic concept of 'symbol' (ch. 2.4) leads to a reformulation of the freudian concept of drives, i.e. to the theory of interactionforms (ch. 2.5). Linking his insights, Lorenzer gives an account of repression (ch. 2.6). With this conceptual foundation, it is possible to formulate an answer: the analyst applies

'scenical comprehension' (ch. 2.7). In chapter 3.1, it is argued that Lorenzer's meta-theory might serve as a tool for interpreting the clinical theory of the kleinian school. A draft is laid out on how to reformulate the theory of positions, (pre-) conceptions, confusional states in schizophrenia and, finally, projective identification in lorenzerian terms. A thorough mediation would go beyond the scope of this work. Nevertheless, it is argued that Lorenzer's meta-theory might serve as a shared frame of reference for different schools of thought. This is demonstrated by comparing Josephs's concept of transference as total situation with Lorenzer's concept of scene and situation.

It must be stressed again that this essay is meant to be an introduction. Lorenzer argues in favour of the hermeneutic aspects of psychoanalysis, which suggests a link to the US-Intersubjectivist-tradition. This trace is not followed in this essay, which does neither cover Lorenzer's foundation of applied psychoanalysis, his works on the history of psychoanalysis, his theory of architecture, nor his discussion of the truth of psychoanalytic knowledge.

The term 'interactionform' is a one-to-one translation of the German 'Interaktionsform'. The translation 'forms of interaction' (Hoppe 1977, Dreher 2000, 89) is not used here because it has a slightly idealistic connotation: what is meant is not the pure *form* of an interaction. In fact, Lorenzer always stressed the fact that the interactionform as well as the connected symbol have a neurological precipitate in the human organism: memory traces of sense-impressions and motoric actions, the so-called engramms (Lorenzer 1972a, 106-108).

Citations marked with a * following the page-number are translated by the author.

2. The Analytic Process

The aim Lorenzer set himself was to overcome the scientific isolation psychoanalysis found itself and still finds itself in. In his view, an interdisciplinary approach depends on a shared frame of reference and therefore psychoanalysis can not confine itself to circular argumentations, for example by explaining 'repression' by means of the term 'unconscious' and vice versa. (Lorenzer 1970a, 45). Such a 'closed frame of reference' simply does not allow for an interdisciplinary exchange. What is needed, according to Lorenzer, is a dialectical negotiation (Hegel) of the central concepts. Obviously, such a discussion has to go beyond pure

psychoanalytic theory, thence the subtitle *Preparations for a Meta-theory of Psychoanalysis* (13-14). Such an endeavour, the building up of a psychoanalytic meta-theory that reflects on the scientific status of psychoanalysis, can only be tackled by psychoanalysts themselves due to the specific relation between theory and practice, that characterises psychoanalysis (47). A criterion for the appropriateness of a meta-theory can be seen in the extend to which it is coherent with the theory itself and in its extend to which it allows for an understanding in colloquial terms (48).

Due to the specific relation between theory and practice in Psychoanalysis, a meta-theory can not merely focus on pure theory. It is a striking phenomenon that psychoanalysts work within the same setting, i.e. the couch, but nevertheless come to contradictory conclusions regarding the scientific status. Thence, a meta-theory has to begin with the question: what happens in the consulting room?

2.1 Competing Theories and Criteria to be met

To begin with, the most prominent concepts in discussions on the scientific status of psychoanalysis are maybe the notions of understanding and explaining. According to Thorner and Kuiper, psychoanalysis is a psychology based on understanding in the sense of Dilthey (51, c. Thorner 1963, 685), while for Loch, following Loewenstein and Hartmann, psychoanalytic interpretations are of an explaining character (Loch 1965, p. 37). Despite these differences, both parties define a supplementary role for the opposing term (Lorenzer 1970a, 51).

Following Loch, for instance, 'understanding' is applied, firstly, in following the patient's verbal communications and, secondly, when an interpretation is given in the words of the patient. The heart of psychoanalytic technique, the interpretation itself, is nevertheless based on explanations. The development of an interpretation rests on explanatory functions within the analyst. From this follows that in its essence, psychoanalytic interpretations are explanations, i.e. that psychoanalysis is a natural science (51-52). Lorenzer summarises Loch's view as follows:

"A mother reports that she is alarmed by the condition of her child's health. She worries and sees herself being forced to reduce the child's play-activity and its striving for independence. ... The doctor refers to this as an 'overprotection' (semantic interpretation – Loch). The process of translation consists of two steps – given we respect the introduced rules without exception:

The analyst understands the verbal communication of the patient due to a shared language.
He names the understood with a name stemming from his scientific language.
Loch goes on and elaborates on the propositional part of the interpretation, aiming at an explanatory concept for the behaviour captured in the first part of the process. ... In the propositional part of the interpretation it is stated that 'basically the mother rejects her child'. The propositional part of the interpretation contains a 'motive', a 'law-like statement' as Loch puts it in using G. Ryle's words." (55-56*)
Looking closer at Loch's solution of the dichotomy of understanding and explaining, this conclusion might appear invalid. Lorenzer examines the role of hypotheses and follows Binswanger:
"Paying tribute to the 'experienced contextual connections', one has to take into consideration Binswanger's words: 'while a psychology that starts from an understanding of the unmediated experiences of a context ends with a hypothesis, a psychology following the model of natural sciences begins with a hypothesis.' " (Lorenzer 1970a, 53-54*)
Attention is drawn to the fact that normally, the 'relevant data' that is translated into the scientific language is not found in one sentence. Normally, the 'relevant data' has to be extracted from several comments of the patient. If this is the case, how does the analyst spot this data? The possible answer would be that he has got already a hypothesis in mind that allows him to differentiate between relevant and irrelevant 'data'. Obviously, the term 'overprotection' already includes a specific hypothesis that is applied in the step of translating the behaviour of the mother into a scientific language. From this would follow that the first step is not a proper understanding anymore. Rather, in terms of Binswanger, this first step would be an explanatory one because there is a hypothesis involved (Lorenzer 1970a, 57).
Examining the explanatory 'propositional' aspect, Lorenzer comes to the conclusion that what Loch describes as an operating with theoretical hypotheses can be applied to an 'unscientific understanding' of the emotional state of another person as well. Here then, no scientific hypotheses are involved and one ends up in describing the same process Loch investigates as a kind of 'understanding'. Lorenzer summarises that Loch's approach is full of hidden questions. Still, the question 'How do we understand another's psyche?' remains unanswered.
Further problems do arise: There seems to be evidence that a great deal of the process of forming an interpretation happens preconsciously. Lorenzer

quotes form a case-presentation at the Sigmund-Freud-Institut where the consensus was formed that in the presented case, the hypothesis was wrong but the given interpretation was correct (63). He links this insight to Isaacs' statement:

"We perceive the unconscious meaning of the patient's words and conduct as an objective process. Our ability to see it depends, as I have said, on a wealth of processes in ourselves, partly conscious and partly unconscious." (Isaacs 1939, 150)

A theory of interpretation that is based on hypothesising cannot account for this circumstance. Following the psychoanalytic consensus, the process always starts with a certain kind of 'understanding' (Lorenzer 1970a, 68). Explanations only serve as a substitute for a proper understanding (77). Putting it this way then, at least one problem has to be solved: according to Hartmann,

"understanding (in the sense of sympathetic experience of actual mental events) encounters its necessary limits ... in the unconscious life of the mind" (Hartmann 1927, 389)

A theory based on 'understanding' has to give a precise account of how 'understanding' evolves and of how the Unconscious can be reached by 'understanding'.

2.2 Logical Comprehension and the Experience of sudden Evidence

If one looks at the classic setting (couch) it strikes one that it is the worst possible set up for observations of behaviour. Rapaport's statement that the object of psychoanalysis is behaviour (Rapaport 1959, p. 39) therefore cannot be interpreted in 'behaviourist terms'. The only behaviour that can be observed is verbal communication (Lorenzer 1970a, 80-81). Furthermore, 'objective external observations' are considered to be a distraction from the psychoanalytic stance. Contrary to every other science, there is no way of gathering 'objective data' that could be applied for validating hypotheses. Since Freud had abandoned the theory of seduction and began to focus on the psychic reality of the patient, the question of factual truth ('did it really happen that way?') was somehow suspended. Lorenzer draws attention to Wittgenstein's early theory of language and demonstrates a parallel (Wittgenstein 1921, 4.021, 4.022, 4.024, 4.026).

During the session, the analyst focuses on the verbal communications of the patient in order to understand what the patient is saying. This logical comprehension is based on a formation of a Gestalt. The first prove of

reliability can be called an 'experience of sudden evidence'. Anni Reich has described this phenomenon already:

"Frequently the analyst can observe that insight into the material comes suddenly as if from somewhere within his own mind. Suddenly the confusing incomprehensible presentations make sense; suddenly the disconnected elements become a *Gestalt*. Equally suddenly, the analyst gets inner evidence as to what his interpretations should be and how it should be given." (Reich 1951, p.25)

It has to be stated that this process of validation happens *within* the analyst who becomes aware of this process and its sudden result (Lorenzer 1970a, 87). Lorenzer summarises a first thesis:

"The content of the other mind is experienced as a fabric of sense. The experience happens within the analyst as an 'experience of sudden evidence' of a logical comprehension. The experienced reality is the reality of the presented symbols forming the verbal communications." (89*)

Obviously, this depends on a shared language of analysand and analyst. Lorenzer states that the understanding does not happen by means of shared meanings. In a first step, a sentence is understood. Yet, the precise meaning of each word still has to be found out. While the language is shared, the meanings of words still are somehow 'private' phenomena (93):

"Its element, the *word* ... does not, like a substance, purvey something already produced, nor does it contain an already *closed* concept; it merely provokes the user to form such a concept under his own power, albeit in a particular way. ... The idea evoked by the word in different people bears the stamp of each one's individuality, but is designated by all of them with the same sound." (Humboldt 1836, 151-152)

An example can illuminate this. A patient says to his analyst "Yesterday, I had an argument with my boss!" This sentence is understood, but the precise meanings of the word 'boss', for example, are not shared. The analyst applies his own meanings on a trial-basis (Lorenzer 1970a, 91). The concept 'boss' is understood by remembering own scenes and experiences with one's own (maybe even former) 'boss'. This, of course, defines the over all task: the analyst has to find out about the patient's own meanings.

The only way to do this is to conclude the specific meanings from the whole of the patient's symbolic system, his whole language forming an overall fabric of sense (92). The whole language of a person is an articulation of this person's experience (95). In a single session, the analyst listens with a free-floating attention and tries to get the Gestalt of the whole communication. He does not follow each single sentence but looks

for the underlying Gestalt that is expressed by means of several different communications. In listening to the patient, the analyst, step by step, builds up a picture of the whole symbolic system of the patient and its individuality. Slowly, he grasps the specific meanings of the patient's words. This method, concluding the single meaning form the overall context, is the classic hermeneutic circle (95).
Lorenzer summarises that due to the essential connection of a sentence to the state of affairs (Wittgenstein 1921, 4.03), the inter-subjective character of sentences is at the same time an inter-subjectivity of 'experiences of world' (Lorenzer 1970a, 98).
"As we are already understood by means of sharing sentences about the logical structure of the world, with each single spoken sentence the understanding about the meanings is widened. With each further step, meaning is circled in closer and closer. This opens up a road towards building up a stable system of symbols that captures the specificities of this patient by means of general concepts – and finally, although it appears to be a very long but nevertheless possible way, there seems to be a way to include the factual reality of this patient as well, a reality Wittgenstein's remarks aim at." (99*)
Although it seems indisputable that psychoanalysis rests on hermeneutics, we can now formulate the problem already addressed by Hartmann more precisely: Reliable knowledge about the content of another's mind can only be achieved by means of logical comprehension to the extend the community of speech is defined. The Unconscious, per definition, is excluded from this community; it lies outside the borders of language (100). The way psychoanalysis reaches unconscious content still lacks explanation

2.3 Empathy and the Experience of Sudden Evidence

Can empathy cross the border to the Unconscious? A clinical example might shed light on this problem:
"The patient makes the verbal communication: 'I am sad'. We are not yet sure whether he really is sad. Accompanying the verbal communication, we hear a sound that can be understood as either maybe a strangled sob or maybe a suppressed laughing. We see that he wipes off some tears and, in turning his head, maybe we get a short glance of a facial expression that, in the context of all the other perceptions, we can only interpret to our selves as a sad one. We are sure that the patient is sad – or that he has got a convincing talent for acting." (101*)

Several aspects of the role of empathy in the clinical situation can be seen in action here: the emotional state of the patient is communicated by means of gestures. Their specific meaning is left open as it is in the case of logical comprehension. The question of truth is suspended here as well. We get a first glimpse of the specific meaning because it is embedded in a 'dramatic plot'. After several hundreds of sessions, we then know enough about the biography to confirm specific meanings (101).
Nevertheless, even in the case of empathy in a single session, we do have moments of 'sudden evidence'. They relate to the gestures. We understand their sense without knowing whether the expressed emotional state is 'true'. Acting rests on this differentiation: actors can communicate emotions by means of gestures without *necessarily* experiencing them as their own. Nevertheless, the depth of emotions displayed on stage thrills the audience (102). Lorenzer links his view with aspects put forward by G. H. Mead on the role of gestures (Mead 1934). Although Mead's theory could be challenged in several views, it is this aspect that Lorenzer picks up to support his argument: even in the case of gestures, and that is the case of empathy as argued above, we do not go beyond the boundaries of 'being understood', of successful communication. Empathy does not enable us to reach unconscious content, excluded form communication. Again, we are facing the same situation encountered in the realm of logical comprehension:
"In the case of empathy, we face a disjunction of the question of sense and factual truth, too. Similar to the (formal) correspondence of a proposition, communication takes place by applying stencils of action; the experience of sudden evidence is rooted in anticipations. The meaning of the single gesture is not validated. Empathy, too, is not able to cross the border to the Unconscious. ... In order to enable our investigation to proceed, an additional investigation has to be inserted: a critical investigation of the psychoanalytic concept of 'symbol' explaining the relation between language and unconscious content." (Lorenzer 1970a, 105*)

2.4 Critique of the Psychoanalytic Concept of 'Symbol'

Throughout the history of psychoanalysis, the different concepts of symbolism have lead to splits and gave rise to several 'dissenting' movements, as can be seen for instance in Silberer's, Maeder's, Steckel's or Jung's case (Lorenzer 1972b, 50). At the same time, the concept of symbol played a major role outside psychoanalytic circles, most prominently maybe in the works of Cassirer or Langer (Cassirer 1944, Langer 1942). Ignoring these developments, psychoanalysis entrenches

itself. Marion Milner has stressed this already in the context of this discussion (Milner 1955, 105-106). Psychoanalysis, of course, would not be well advised to give up central claims just to be able to communicate with other scientific disciplines:

"And indeed, one has good reasons to ask for intra-psychoanalytic evidence that a concept, of the centrality and well-introduced status as the notion of 'Symbol' is, does not any longer serve its purpose and that a revision of this concept is unavoidable. Only when it can be demonstrated that the conceptual revision is useful for psychoanalytic thinking itself, that it is useful not only for purposes of communication, the revision is well justified." (Lorenzer 1972b, 51*)

In the work of Freud, Lorenzer detects three different concepts of 'symbol'. In the early writings, a symbol was a mere indication of an incident that was repressed. The focus was on the temporal indication and not on the meaning of it (Freud 1895, 348-350; Lorenzer 1970b, 13-14). The second concept focused on a kind of internal similarity between what is reported and what is acted out. Freud reports from a lunch with a colleague, who, while talking about a missed job opportunity, let a piece of cake drop from his knife (Freud 1901, 201). The third concept of 'symbol' can already be found in the *Interpretation of Dreams* (Freud 1899, 354-357). The symbol proper is characterised by a constant, universal meaning (Lorenzer 1970b, 20-21). It represents unconscious content, is based on the early development and phylogenetic parallels can be found, as Freud later stated. (Freud 1916-17, 149-169).

The idea of a 'trans-individual language of the unconscious' became more and more important. Jung picked up this motive and, following Silberer, developed this idea further (Lorenzer 1970b, 21). The ontological orientation led back to the myth-like ideas prominent during romanticism (23). The implicit 'danger' can be described like this: a) symbols have got a constant and trans-individual meaning; b) symbols are manifestations of the unconscious. From a) and b) follows that the unconscious is independent from the subject and that one might perceive the unconscious as an essence that reveals itself in symbols (25). It was Ferenczi who criticised this and put forward a functional concept of the unconscious (Ferenczi 1912, 277-8; 1913, 393-4). Jones' paper (Jones 1916) settled the discussion to a certain degree (Lorenzer 1970b, 30).

"All psycho-analytical experience goes to show that the primary ideas of life, the only ones that can be symbolised – those, namely, concerning the bodily self, the relation to the family, birth, love, and death – retain in the unconscious throughout life their original importance, and that from them

is derived a large part of the more secondary interests of the conscious mind. As energy flows from them, and never to them, and as they constitute the most repressed part of the mind, it is comprehensible that symbolism should take place in one direction only. Only what is repressed is symbolised; only what is repressed needs to be symbolised. This conclusion is the touchstone of the psycho-analytical theory of symbolism." (Jones 1916, 158)

Obviously, symbolisation was back in the realm of the subject again. The ontological view was dismissed and symbolism was connected to the primary process. This was an attempt to solve the problem posed by a functional concept of the unconscious, namely the distinction between unconscious, preconscious and conscious (Lorenzer 1970b, 34).

However, this lead to severe difficulties in communicating with other disciplines. For Ernst Cassirer, a neo-kantian philosopher, a mathematical equation was the most sophisticated symbol. Myths, symphonies (music) or just normal language were interpreted as 'symbolic forms' (Cassirer 1944).

"Language has often been identified with reason. ... side by side with logical or scientific language there is a language of poetic imagination. ... Reason is a very inadequate term with which to comprehend the forms of man's cultural life in all their richness and variety. But all these forms are symbolic forms. Hence, instead of defining man as an *animal rationale*, we should define him as an *animal symbolicum*." (28)

By means of a symbol, things can be imagined and a response to a stimulus can be delayed, a development beautifully described in case studies on Laura Bridgeman and Helen Keller (36-37). Langer develops this theory of culture (or anthropology) further and picks up the concept of presentative and discursive symbolism, both forming a continuum of symbolic expressions (Langer 1942). A similar trend took place in other disciplines as well, e.g. in developmental psychology, semantics or logics (Lorenzer 1970b, 41). These evolving views were strictly opposed to Jones' theory of 'true symbolism', in so far as they suggested different levels of symbolformation instead of narrowing down the notion to unconscious processes.

While Jones, coming from a drive-theory informed background, stressed the influence of the id, especially within ego psychology, new developments took place. Anna Freud perceived the ego as a structuring agency and the id as an energetic potential (Freud, A. 1936); Kris developed the concept of 'regression in the service of the ego' (Kris 1953) and Melanie Klein already put forward the view that symbolism was the

origin of sublimation (Klein 1923, 1930). Although most of these authors more or less tried to avoid an open conflict with Jones' view, they implicitly departed from it (c. Lorenzer 1970b, 56). It was only in the 1960ties that opposing views were explicitly formulated:

"The assumption of Jones that only what is repressed needs to be symbolized is clearly erroneous." (Hacker 1965, 78)"Symbolism is a basic attribute of human behaviour and not an archaic, frustrated, repressed, regressive, primitive, or defective form of expression." (Hacker 1965, 92)

Lorenzer summarises the new concept as being based upon an internal perception of content stemming from the unconscious. He compares this process of internal perception with studies from Ploetzel on subliminal influences, which proved that the stimuli were internally processed but still different from the ego' s capacity to perceive (Lorenzer 1970b, 66-67; Freud 1899, 181).

How can this new view be integrated without threatening the central concept of the Unconscious? Following Arlow (1958), Lorenzer states that 'primary process' refers to thought processes as well as to energetic processes. The primary process as a lower level of 'thought-organisation' refers to free, mobile energy, while secondary process as a higher level of 'thought-organisation' (intentional thinking) refers to stable cathexis and neutralised energy. Applying Arlow's differentiation to the problem at hand, it becomes obvious that the theory of a two-fold thought-organisation (Jones) is due to a methodological mistake. If one examines symbolisation form an energetic point of view, one comes to the conclusion that it is linked to the Id. If one examines symbolism from the functional point of view (where does symbolism take place?), one comes to the conclusion that it is linked to the ego. To solve this dichotomy, Lorenzer suggests the term 'primary organisation', that is not defined through an agency (Lorenzer 1970b, 70):

"Basically, for symbolformation we have to assume two centres at the same time. Depending on the type of question, one or the other centre is focused. If the processes of symbolformation are discussed the ego necessarily becomes the centre of the investigation even within Psychoanalysis. If the dynamic-energetic concept is stressed in the course of the investigation, eo ipso the Id is focussed. While to an epistemo-psychological consideration the ego appears to be the central agency of the psychological subject, the id-contents being (beneath others) the objects of perception, a dynamic psychology turns around and in its dynamic-energetic frame of reference the Id is perceived as an energetic centre

from which the cathexis reaches out for the representations." (Lorenzer 1970b, 70-71*)
In dreams, for instance, several dynamic influences can be identified: external or bodily processes, day-residues, recalled content, and, last but not least, the Unconscious. Symbolisation takes place in the Ego under specific influence of the Unconscious (Lorenzer 1970b, 71). Otherwise, inventory dreams like those of Descartes or Kekulé would lack explanation (73-77).

2.5 Interactionforms as Representations

The discussion of the psychoanalytic concept of symbolism has demonstrated the need to discuss the theory of representations, a concept belonging to the dynamic-energetic frame of reference of 'classical' metapsychology. Lorenzer examines the view of Beres (1965), who more or less identifies symbols with representations (Lorenzer 1970b, 90). In so far as unconscious symbols are, according to Beres, a contradiction in itself, unconscious representations are dismissed as well. Lorenzer points out that this claim does not fit to psychoanalytic experience, namely because it is a consensus that in the course of an analysis, repressed representations are worked through and become conscious (93). Although unconscious representations lack the characteristics of symbols, they can still be cathected.
To solve this problem, Lorenzer differentiates between symbols and interactionforms. Reformulating drive-theory in terms of interactionforms, Lorenzer goes beyond the so-called Freudo-Marxists like Reich, Bernfeld and others in stressing the practical dialectics in nature as opposed to human beings and at the same time in stressing the dialectics of nature human beings themselves are (10). Focussing on primary socialisation, Lorenzer states that emotional processes are to be dealt with first, before 'higher' functions like thinking can be conceptualised (24). These emotional, affective processes hint towards vicissitudes of drives, i.e. object-relations. Following the psychoanalytic consensus, Lorenzer examines the role of the mother-child-dyad (m-ch-d), which is the abbreviation of 'relationship of the infant with its primary object in a specific culture at a specific time' (26). In the m-ch-d, the first need-regulation takes place in the form of an intimate co-operation. Its precursors are organismic intrauterine stimulus-reaction patterns that are formed long before any kind of infantile capacity to experience can be detected. These early stimulus-reaction-patterns are the first structures that are built up and everything new has to be adopted to the already existing

structures, how ever undifferentiated or purely organismic they may be (27, 28).

The post-natal drive-regulation can be characterised as an interaction between two opposing organisms. A successful physiological agreement on a need-satisfaction must be understood as a specific interaction between the two poles of the conflictual relationship. The resulting successful interactional agreement is meant to be a sublation that preserves the original tensions (Hegel). From this point of view, the m-ch-d is best understood as a dialectic relationship in which both organisms have to adjust to each other. To illustrate an unsuccessful agreement, Lorenzer refers to the work of R. Spitz (34-36; Spitz 1951). The developing drive-regulation unfolds in a scenical interplay and leads to an individual profile, laid down in the infantile organism as interaction-engramms. Future satisfactions have to meet these existing interactional structures of drive-regulation. Form and content of the drive-regulation determine future experiencing.

If the preceding stimulus-reaction-patterns formed during pregnancy are understood to be a kind of continuum, how can a dialectic relationship evolve from this continuum? A temporal structuring happens already in the womb, due to periods of stimuli (e.g. sounds etc.) and undisturbed satisfaction. The spatial differentiation takes place in birth. Due to physiological maturation, the continuum slowly develops into a relationship between two organisms (Lorenzer 1972a, 41-46). Yet it must be kept in mind that, although the mother-embryo-unity has ceased, the m-ch-d still is a rather undifferentiated process from the perspective of the infantile organism. Mother and infant form an interacting couple. For each type of need-satisfaction, a specific form of the interaction is developed in a dialectical process. The resulting 'scenes' are internalised as interactionforms. In the course of later development, these scenes will be differentiated into self- and object-representations. At this stage, subject and object form an *undifferentiated scene*, a point that cannot be stressed too much!

So far, only the natural aspect of bodily needs of the infantile organism have been considered. How does the social impact come into play? First of all, the maternal interaction is determined by the mother's own primary socialisation and therefore links the m-ch-d to the preceding generation, to the internalised social norms. The class-position of the mother is another main factor. Furthermore, the interaction in the m-ch-d can be interpreted as a form of practice. Lorenzer compares the maternal practice with the practice of a worker. In the case of a farmer, for instance, the form of

production and the form of the product result from labour. Both are a struggle with nature. Applied to the m-ch-d, the infantile bodily needs represent nature. The mother's actions to meet these bodily needs are of a physical character and are therefore practice, a form of labour, the only difference being a living object in the former and an inanimate object in the latter case (49-52). In referring to Freud, Lorenzer summarises:

"The phrase, coined by altering a statement of Freud, 'the subject is the precipitate of its interactionforms' took for granted that the course of development laid out here is a distinct feature of human socialisation. Our comparison of the mother-child-dyad with the work of a farmer raising an animal could have caused irritations already. Considering the following report, our basic assumption must definitely be regarded as invalid." (53-54*)

Lorenzer quotes a passage from Lévi-Strauss (Lévi-Strauss 1955, 342-43): The description of the interaction between him and a monkey matches with Lorenzer's description of the m-ch-d as a dialectic relationship, as a mutual and practical 'agreement' on a specific interaction. Again, Cassirer's anthropology (human being as animal symbolicum) lends itself to a solution. According to Langer and Cassirer, symbols can be contrasted to signals. Language as a symbolic system allows not only for a specific type of communication, it allows for a communication about meanings themselves as well. Language as a symbolic system has its own syntax, a set of rules how words can and cannot form a sentence (Lorenzer 1972a, 56). This distinguishes language from other 'symbolic forms' like art or music. Lorenzer examines theories of meaning and formulates an underlying consensus that words and language serve several ends: 1) 'meaning' is connected to actions; not only is the word 'hammer' the name for a distinct set of shape and colour, it also implies several potential practices, for instance hitting a nail; these actions are part of the meaning of the concept 'hammer' (57); 2) words are verbal representations of emotions; 3) language is a medium in which groups are formed.

If one looks at the way a child learns language, a link to interactionforms comes into sight. A new word is learned in a specific situation: an adult hints towards a thing and utters the name of it. The child learns to pronounce the name and realises that this name only applies to a specific thing. This linguistic view can be reformulated if one equates the 'thing' that is named with an interactionform, with a distinct scene of interaction (77):

"The situation of agreement on a specific interactionform is transformed into a situation of introduction to language by means of linking an

interactionform with a sound, with a phonetic complex. ... *The interactionform realised in the present interaction is named. ...*

The mother says a word, e.g. 'Mum';

With an implicit gesture, the mother therefore hints towards the interaction acquired by the child as a specific interactionform.;

The child hears the word as part of the present interaction, i.e. as a designation of this interactionform;

The child speaks a word – e.g. 'mum' – as part of the interaction. It is listener to its own utterance and thereby the senso-motoric circuit of speaking is formed. This mutual aspect of the experience [speaking and hearing], in the child forms the basic unity of activity and passivity from which the capacity of independent action evolves." (66-67*).

In this step, the specific interactionform is transformed into a symbolic interactionform. Only when this step has taken place, the level of 'eternal presence' of interacting is transformed into a temporal order. Scenes can be remembered or imagined because the symbol stands for the scene and the interaction itself does not necessarily have to take place. Due to the fact that a symbol is shared by others, subjects can communicate with each other by means of shared symbols. 'Things', i.e. scenes of interaction, become permanently linked to symbols and symbols have a distinct position in the overall system of language. 'Rose' has a different relation the word 'lilly' compared to its relation to the concept 'plant' (75).

How do subject and object of a scene develop from the undifferentiated continuum? Only by means of predication, i.e. the development of symbolic interactionforms, scenes can be compared with each other and slowly the child realises one more or less constant pole in the different interactionforms, namely what is later called 'Me' (80). Here, the interactional continuum is differentiated into me and not-me, into subject and object. A precursory differentiation has been formulated by Piaget: different sense-data are connected, e.g. the visual images of a bottle and the motoric activities of grabbing it. This leads towards a first differentiation of me and not-me *within* a specific scene and is the foundation of comparing the different poles of different interactional scenes once they are symbolised (92). Although Piaget falls prey to an implicit subjectivism (83-94), his concept of generalisation is of high importance. In the course of biological maturation, the needs of the infantile organism change. The agreements on specific interactionforms have to be renewed in each developmental stage, i.e. the meaning of words change in the course of development: 'mum' has a different meaning in the

oral and the anal stage, because the interactionform that is symbolised is an altered one (97). The interactionforms of mastered developmental stages do not disappear but they rather form a pool of emotional processes underlying the present symbolic interactionforms (118-119). In fact, it is not only the biological maturation that enhances development. Frustration plays a major role in differentiating interactionforms, too (97). Lorenzer summarises his approach in three drawings shown below:



taken from: Lorenzer 1972, p. 101*

Paradigm 2: cold-frustrating situation named: 'Mum'



taken from: Lorenzer 1972, p. 102*

Paradigm 3: warming and cold-frustrating situations in respect to the same object



taken from: Lorenzer 1972, p. 104*

2.6 The Unconscious and Desymbolisation

Lorenzer links his view on the unconscious with Freud's concept of thing-presentation and word-presentation. The thing-presentation is interpreted as a presentation of a specific interactionform (Lorenzer 1981). In his view, the unconscious is built from interactionforms that have not been

symbolised, i.e. that have not been linked to a word-presentation, and from interactionforms that have lost their connection to a word-presentation. The latter are called de-symbolised interactionforms and are an outcome of repression. The advantage of symbolised interactionforms is the fact that they can be imagined. Experiencing them is not any longer dependent on the presence of the real interaction. In the case of repression, this advantage has turned into a disadvantage. Given coherent interactionforms have been developed in the m-ch-d, there will come a time, e.g. in the genital phase, when interactionforms that will never occur at the same time can be linked to each other by means of imagination and thereby cause conflict (the classic oedipal situation). Getting rid of one of the conflicting interactionforms can only solve the conflict. A step in this direction is to cut the thing-representation from the word-representation again. This is the process of repression (118). The outcome can be described like this: the desymbolised interactionform loses its symbolic features and falls back into a stimulus-reaction-pattern. Whenever a situation occurs that triggers this interactionform, either in imagination or in external reality, the interaction follows the unconscious 'script'. This process often described as 'compulsion to repeat' takes place in the back of the subject, because the 'script' has been excluded form language, the link to language being a prerequisite for conscious perception. Furthermore, the interactionform loses its differentiation into subject and object as well. It becomes a fixed stencil of interaction, for which Lorenzer coins the term cliché (Lorenzer 1970a, 115-116; for summary of Lorenzer's view on little Hans see Hoppe 1977).

2.7 Scenical Comprehension

If repressed or unconscious material is excluded from language, why does psychoanalysis claim to be capable of making the unconscious conscious again by means of a 'talking cure'? How can the unconscious be reached and re-integrated into language if it cannot, by definition, be communicated verbally?

Before an answer can be formulated, it is necessary to further illuminate the relation between clichés and symbolic interactionforms. Lorenzer points out that cliché-dominated actions never occur unmediated. Like in dreams or slips of the tongue, a secondary revision always comes into play. In the case of actions, this can be seen for instance in rationalisations (Lorenzer 1970a, 124). He gives the following example: a patient has a got a row with his boss. He behaves kindly, i.e. in accordance to the role of 'boss'. Nevertheless, the patient has got outbreaks of rage, in which he

reproduces infantile behaviour. Rationalisations ('he really is despotic'), reactions (the boss allows the authoritative father figure to evolve) and defences altogether form a scene. The patient can describe this scene; i.e. it can be symbolised. Yet it is obvious that this symbolising does not really work out (the scene happens over and over again). Why? In the scene, the patient reacts to his boss as if is he was his father. Indeed, in the description of the patient, the father does not turn up, only the boss is mentioned. In terms of representations, on might put it this way: 'boss' = boss (+ father). The name 'boss' is linked to the representation of the head of the company and, unconsciously, the representation boss is linked to the representation of the patient's father. The patient's meaning of 'boss' therefore has been changed. 'Boss' has become a 'pseudo-communicative private language' (Wittgenstein), as Lorenzer puts it, because the additional father-representation is not commonly shared as a meaning of the word 'boss' (125-126).

So far, it was argued that both, logical comprehension and empathy come into play but are not sufficient for reaching the unconscious. The former aims at understanding of what is said, the latter aims at an understanding of the speaker himself (Lorenzer 1970a, 138). The psychoanalytic stance goes beyond both modes and can be characterised as an attempt to understand the patient's utterances as comments on experiences. The patient's utterances present the experience without being a statement *about* the presented processes of experience. As has been argued above, experiences always take place in a kind of scenical arrangement. A very simple example from the couch could be 'I have fallen in love' vs. 'I associate Romeo, that's it' (139). While the former statement is part of a symbolic interactionform, the later presents the scene in a distorted form. In analysis, it is tried to spot the underlying situational pattern presented in the communications of the patient. Lorenzer conceptualises this stance as 'scenical comprehension'. Throughout the psychoanalytic process, scenical arrangements in the form of situations are focussed and are worked through.

Three different kinds of situations, i.e. realised scenes, can be differentiated: 1) actual situations; 2) infantile situations; 3) transference and counter-transference situations (141). In order to illustrate this classification, it is referred to the example of the patient reporting a row with his boss (actual situation). The analyst remembers a recent discussion with the analysand about the amount of sessions they have had (transference situation). The patient later on associates an argument with his father (infantile situation) (145).

"It is the interactional patterns that allow for tracing back in the most diverse experiences one and the same scenical arrangement underlying all of them." (144*)

The interactional pattern is the red thread in the fabric of scenes that is spotted. The diverse situations are thread onto this string in the mind of the analyst. This process is experienced as a moment of sudden 'scenical evidence', as described in the case of logical comprehension and empathy already. Again, the scenical Gestalt is a complex and the meaning of its single constituents are still unknown (146). The analyst applies his own scenes, i.e. meanings stemming from his own biography, for an initial understanding. In an hermeneutic circle, the specific meanings, i.e. the situations stemming from the biography of the analysand, come to the fore.

Looking at the psychoanalytic technique of clarifications and interpretations, this process can be further illuminated. In the example of the patient associating 'Romeo' the presented scene is distorted by defence-mechanisms ('Juliet' is left out). The scene is an unfinished Gestalt, a fact Devereux, Kris and Lewin have pointed out already in stating that successful interpretations complete the scene presented (168, 170). Completing the scene means:

"Uncovering the aspects of the scene that have so far been hidden. It is these aspects that hint towards those parts of the situational structures that have been warded off and have been distorted by means of defence-mechanisms ...

1) The completion aims at the restoration of the full cognitive and emotional spectrum of the psyche. It is an '*actual completion*'.

2) It is accompanied by another completion with a different perspective. This one could be called '*historical completion*'. Its aim is to restore along the chain of symbols the mutilated aspects of meaning stemming from the individual's biography.

Of course, both kinds of completion go hand in hand – the complete affective content of meaning of a scene can not be grasped without uncovering and working-through the historical dimension. The depth of the historical dimension can not be sounded of without unrestricted restoration of the affective content." (171*)

The analytic process sets in with the analyst trying to grasp the presented scenes. Clarifications serve the purpose to let the Gestalt of the situation evolve more clearly. This actual completion does not lift the repression: it leads the patient to provide more scenical material, some of it stemming from infancy. Here, the historical completion sets in until the original

incident can be identified and interpreted (172). Only when this level is reached, the desymbolised interactionform can be linked to the correct symbol again. The compulsion to repeat comes to a halt and the specific way of relating can be integrated into the conscious self- and object-representations.

In order to conceptualise the role of countertransference Lorenzer refers back to the late Wittgenstein. A symbolised interactionform can be understood as a language game. It is a unit of life practice, usage of language and comprehension of world:

"19. ... And to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life. ...

23. Here the term 'language game' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the *speaking* of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life. ...

241. ... It is what human beings *say* that is true or false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life." (Wittgenstein 1953)

In the case of repression, the rules of practice lose their symbolic character but nevertheless are still active. Is there a way to participate in the repressed practice directly in order to understand the rules? So far, the psychoanalytic process only focused on the psychic reality of the patient, on his system of symbols. Due to the fact that analyst and analysand do interact in the session, focussing on the 'here and now' of the transference can be understood as an unmediated participation in the language games of the patient (Lorenzer 1970b, 204-205). This unmediated participation has been discussed in psychoanalysis under the heading of countertransference:

"The comprehension of the scenes of the patient as individually structured situations, i.e. scenical comprehension, allows to perceive that part of the dramatic plot in oneself as a participant in the language game the other has lost access to. ... Vice versa, the necessary presupposition for scenical comprehension is the capacity to participate in the situation by means of an identification with either the patient himself or with a person he is in relation to." (212*)

Lorenzer links his view with statements of Anni Reich, Helene Deutsch, René Spitz, H. Racker, R. Greenson, P. Heimann etc. The analyst becomes object of the instinctual drives of the patient. He temporarily identifies with a role in the patient's situation and thereby participates in the emotions present in that scene. He understands his emotional reactions as belonging to the patient and thereby solves the identification again. His

knowledge about the patient derives from a process that takes place within himself (212).
"scenical comprehension is rooted in an identification, it is based on the analyst's process of participation (via identification) in the scene of the patient, and that means: the analyst adapts to the interactional structure of the patient in order to overcome the transference position by pushing forward the process of resolution and enlightenment, by bringing his participation back to language." (213*)
":... the 'flexible emotional sense' (c. Heimann 1956) of the analyst rest on an interwoveness into the situation of the patient. The analyst participates in the scenes of the patient. He is able to understand, because he is included into the dramatic conceptions of the patient either concordantly or complementary." (215*)
This process of scenical participation and its transformation into verbalised and understood participation is a constant one through out the analysis. It may come to a halt when either there is a lack of identification or if the identification cannot be put into words, cannot be verbalised. It must be kept in mind that the whole process rests on anticipations of meaning, i.e. the analyst has to use the according part of his own personality in order to identify with the patient.

3 Critique of Lorenzer's Meta-Theory

This essay is meant to provide an introduction to Lorenzer's theories. A critic would call for a more detailed account that cannot be given here. Nevertheless, it might appear to be a valid criticism that his theories do not provide new clinical insights. In order to defend Lorenzer's position, one might stress that clinical insights were not the aim of his work, in so far as his theories were meant to be a meta-theory and not a clinical one. Following this line of argument, the reader coming from a kleinian background might question the validity of Lorenzer's meta-theory. Indeed, throughout his writings, Lorenzer hardly refers to kleinian theory, although hidden links can be detected. Even in his paper on unconscious phantasy (Lorenzer 1981), Kleinians like S. Isaacs or H. Segal are not mentioned.

3.1 Hidden Links to Kleinian Thoughts

Before implicit parallels can be formulated, it is necessary to understand the reasons for the absence of kleinian theory in the work of Lorenzer. It

was his outspoken aim to give an account of the formation of subjectivity formulated in materialistic terms. A theory that appears to stress the early mental life of the infant and thereby assumes an early form of subjectivity is strictly opposed to such an approach. Due to the fact that Lorenzer does quote Melanie Klein (Lorenzer 1970b, 61), Susan Isaacs (1970a, 31, 71, 143) and Paula Heimann (143, 206, 208, 215) it must be assumed that he was familiar with kleinian theory.

Although Lorenzer's 'paradigms 1 & 2' (pp. 24-25) mention an UN-splitted continuum, they can be read as a formulation of the schizoid-paranoid position and the formation of the good and bad breast. Paradigm 3 (p. 25) could be interpreted as a formulation of the depressive position. Such an interpretation is supported by Lorenzer's concept of interactionforms as drive-representations and Isaacs view on unconscious phantasy as drive-representations (Lorenzer 1981). Unconscious phantasies are specific interactionforms, imagined or realized, following their scenical character. They can either be symbolised (as presentational or discursive symbol), de-symbolised (repressed) or not yet been symbolised. Here, the role of aggression and of the death drive would need further elaboration, as Lorenzer heavily criticised the 'Thanatos'-concept (Lorenzer 1981).

Bion's notion of (pre-) conception (Hinshelwood 1989a/b/c) has been applied by Lorenzer as well (Lorenzer 1970a, 215, s.a.), although the reference is not made. The specific interactionforms are the conceptions that come into being by realization of pre-conceptions. In lorenzerian terms: the bodily needs of the infant are 'socialised' into specific interactionforms in the m-ch-d. Here, the notion of pre-conception appears to have a slightly different meaning, in so far as the bodily needs are stressed and not parts of the body (nipple and mouth). Furthermore, a critique of Bion's interpretation of Kant (thing-in-itself, a-priori knowledge; Bion 1962, 100-1) calls for a deeper analysis that cannot be performed here.

Another implicit link to kleinian theory comes into sight in comparing Rosenfeld's view on confusional states (Rosenfeld 1949) and Lorenzer's paper on antagonistic interactionforms in double-bind-situations (Lorenzer 1975). Rosenfeld concludes that the confusional states represent a failed differentiation between good and bad objects. Although Lorenzer's critique of the double-bind-theory stemming from communications-theory cannot be discussed here, the parallels to Rosenfeld are obvious. Referring to Spitz (1951), Lorenzer puts forward the thesis that the situation of agreement in the m-ch-d has failed, due to contradicting actions (and phantasies) of the mother. While trying to give the breast, the mother

unconsciously withdraws the nipple from the infant's mouth. This interaction results in a withdrawal of the infant. The interactionforms 'good-mum' and 'bad-mum' are not formed separately, due to the incoherent interaction.
Looking at psychosis, the defence-mechanism of projective identification calls for a reformulation in lorenzerian terms as well. In brief, Bion's notion of container and contained in the context of projective identification hints at a possible solution (Hinshelwood 1989b). In normal development, projective identification serves as a means of communication in early infancy. The infant communicates its emotional state in this way. The primary object contains this state and gives it back to the infant in a modified form. In lorenzerian terms, this would be part of the formation of an interactionform in the m-ch-d. As this defence-mechanism plays a major role in psychosis, it hints towards a failed practical agreement in the m-ch-d. It is not only a successful agreement that leaves a memory trace in the infant. Linking projective identification with an undifferentiated scene (no subject-object splitting), as Orban does (Orban 1976, 103), cannot serve as an explanation, given that neurotically repressed interactionforms lose their subject-object-differentiation as well.
The four examples (positions & unconscious phantasy, conception, confusional states, projective identification) demonstrate that Lorenzer's meta-theory might be able to serve as a frame of reference for kleinian thinking as well, albeit theoretical differences are obvious. It is argued here that a mediation of kleinian theory and Lorenzer's meta-theory promises to be a fruitful endeavour.

3.2 Scenic comprehension and transference as total situation

When it comes to translation, words and concepts are one essential part to be dealt with, another one is the scientific culture, the discourse and possible links between the translated ideas and similar thoughts that are well known and established. It has been suggested to make such a link between Lorenzer's concept of 'scenic comprehension' and Betty Joseph's concept of transference as 'total situation' (Joseph 1985). In this paper, Betty Joseph describes transference as a framework, in which a constant dynamic interplay evolves. Citing Melanie Klein, Joseph states that what is transferred has to be thought of as total situations:
"It is my experience that in unravelling the details of the transference it is essential to think in terms of total situations transferred from the past into the present as well as emotion defences and object relations." (Klein 1952, 48-56).

According to Josephs' view, the analyst has to deal with
"... everything that the patient brings into the relationship. What he brings in can best be gauged by our focusing our attention on what is going on within the relationship, how he is using the analyst, alongside and beyond what he is saying. Much of our understanding of the transference comes through our understanding of how our patients act on us to feel things for many varied reasons; how they try to draw us into their defensive systems; how they unconsciously act out with us in the transference, trying to get us to act out with them; how they convey aspects of their inner world built up from infancy—elaborated in childhood and adulthood, experiences often beyond the use of words, which we can often only capture through the feelings aroused in us, through our countertransference, used in the broad sense of the word." (Joseph 1985, 447)
In this way, the here-and-now Situation can be used to understand the unconscious aspects underlying the verbal communication. Joseph illustrates this view with clinical vignettes stemming from supervisions as well as from own treatments.
Lorenzer's view on transference comes very close to Joseph's view and surprisingly, he is arguing for the same claim, citing Karl Müller-Braunschweig, a german Analyst:
"At this point, one may ask the question what should be thought of as the primary object of the psychoanalytic occupation. … The patient is not the only and not the primary object of the psychoanalytic occupation. The primary object of the psychoanalytic occupation is that total situation of the two (patient and analyst)!" (Müller-Braunschweig 1953,*)
Lorenzer's theory can help to understand in more detail, how and why these different levels of communication depend on one another.
"The return of the repressed forces the patient to act out in a scenical way in always the same manner. … Repetition compulsion describes nothing else but: being forced to ceaseless reproduction of the neurotic relationship in reality. The invisible drive becomes tangible, as soon as he is staged as a scene and understood as a kind of dramatic plot in vivo; accordingly, the drive-powered interaction can be detected in the situational arrangement of the specific scene. This is what scenical comprehension is about." (Lorenzer 1970a, 200*)
When Joseph stresses the actual relation between therapist and patient, then she relies on this phenomenon, that Lorenzer describes as a splitt-up language-game (Wittgenstein): Interpretations are one essential part of building links between the interaction and language, i.e. linking the interactual representation – speaking with Lorenzer's concepts: the

interactionform – with symbols to differ between object and self, again. As the therapist becomes involved in the unconsciously repeated situational pattern of the patient, he – in contrast to the patient - can think about this interaction and use this knowledge to understand and interpret what the patient talks about without being able to name it.

Comparing Joseph's and Lorenzer's concepts of transference as total situations transferred, one word has to be said concerning the difference between 'scene' and 'situation' according to Lorenzer. Whenever Lorenzer uses the concept 'scene', he has in mind either an actual scene reported by the patient, or an actual scene happening within the therapeutic relationship, or a childhood recollection in form of a scene. Each kind of scene – reported, actual or historic – is concrete and vivid – be it in phantasy or in reality. With the concept 'situation', Lorenzer tries to focus the interactional pattern that underlies these scenes like a model of the relational state of affairs (cf. Lorenzer 1970a, 170f). The difference between situation and scene can be grasped as a kind of abstraction. While a 'scene' always refers to a concrete, vivid experience, the concept 'situation' refers to a kind of logical analysis of the represented relation. Here, a parallel can be drawn to the difference between the metapsychological term object-relation and the realisation of such an object-relation. Thinking about the nature of interpretation, Lorenzer formulates:

"What interpretation tries to make conscious is a situation that is found within a historic scene. Of course, by means of a further abstraction, one could destill another construct, for example a motive. The effect of interpretation does not, however, stem from introducing an explanation, it rather stems from bringing to consciousness a situation in the guise of a historical scene." (Lorenzer 1970a, 168*)

This biographical completion has to go hand in hand with affective and cognitive completion. This is, according to Lorenzer, the cornerstone of the psycho-analytic endeavour.

4 Conclusion

As demonstrated above, neither logical comprehension nor empathy can explain how to reach the unconscious, for both stances rely on a state of successful communication, on a community of speech (language or gestures). The psychoanalytic notion of symbol was criticised and the concept of interactionforms was introduced in order to explain the

meaning of de-symbolisation. With this conceptual foundation, the psychoanalytic stance was described as scenical comprehension, counter-transference as scenical participation leading the way to interpretations that aim at a reconstruction of splitted-up language-games. In the last part, a draft was laid out on how to reconcile kleinian theory with Lorenzer's meta-theory.

Can this meta-theory be described as constructivist approach (Bohleber 2002)? Comparing it to the French tradition of structuralism would suggest parallels to Lacan, although Lorenzer was utterly opposed to this tradition (Lorenzer 1977). He described psychoanalysis as a critical hermeneutic approach and a method that causes practical change and therefore goes beyond the classic hermeneutic method (Lorenzer 1974, 10). Obviously, Lorenzer's meta-theory has got a philosophical aspect: Not only does it provide a materialistic interpretation of Wittgenstein's concept of language-game, it still is a unique analysis of the epistemological status of psychoanalysis. What else does Lorenzer's theory provide? The theory of interactionforms gives an account of the social aspect of nature and of the natural aspect of the social (Lorenzer 1988). Drive-representations are not misperceived anymore as 'pure nature': The society's influence on the individual is not merely a matter of super-ego content but also of id-content. Furthermore, the conceptual problems concerning 'symbol/symbolism' are solved by a reformulation of the primary/secondary process. 'Compulsion to repeat' and the oedipal situation can be explained in terms of symbol-theory.

The author hopes it has become obvious in the course of this essay how deeply rooted Lorenzer's theory is in Freud. Discussing parallels to contemporary theories of mentalisation (Fonagy & Target 2002) would need a critic of Daniel Sterns contributions first. The role of memory (Fonagy 1999) and the lack of a conceptual equivalent to interactionforms in Stern's work would need further discussion. Independent theoreticians will have recognised the stress on the undifferentiated m-ch-d. For a discussion of Winnicott's concept of transitional objects, the reader is referred to Lorenzer & Orban (1978). As suggested above, kleinian thoughts seem to fit into this frame of reference as well, although mediation would be a heavy task. It follows that Lorenzer's work might provide a frame of reference to overcome the splitting into psychoanalytic schools of thought. Albeit these fruitful aspects of Lorenzer's work, there are still questions to be solved: the role of the primal scene, the nature and function of aggression, the interplay of innate schemata and scenical

realisations, to name but a few. For these questions, the reader is referred to a recent publication on the occult (Niedecken 2001).
Why did it take so long for his theories to be acknowledged as unique and outstanding contributions? One reason has been mentioned above: His theory does not provide new clinical insights. Secondly, as one might guess from the style of this essay, Lorenzer's style is not very popular in psychoanalytic thinking, as clinical insights are preferred to detailed hermeneutic and conceptional research. Thirdly, his plain historic-materialistic orientation might have to do with the hesitant reception as well. In the 1970ties in West-Germany, members of the communist party were forced out of office, e.g. teachers, professors, officers etc., due to their political orientation (the so-called 'Berufsverbote'). The last analyst who tried to reconcile Marxism and psychoanalysis was Wilhelm Reich. Looking at the dynamics of the so-called 'Wilhelm-Reich-affair', the role psychoanalysts played during the Third Reich comes into sight as well (Steiner 1989, 59-62, 72-78). From this perspective, It seems as if the working-through of the Nazi-past is somehow connected to the perception of Lorenzer's theory: It was the rejection of the DPV-application to host the IPA-Congress at Berlin 1981, that took place at the Jerusalem Congress in 1977, that finally led to a discussion of the psychoanalytic Nazi-past on a national level in Germany (Bohleber 2001). The mid seventies were the most productive years of Lorenzer.

5. Appendix: Biography

Alfred Lorenzer, born on 8. April 1922 at Ulm, took up his studies in medicine and psychology during the Second World War (Lorenzer 1970b, i) and, due to the war and a war-injury, graduated as a M.D. in 1952 (Görlich 1996, 618). Under the supervision of Ernst Kretschmar, he did his PhD, submitted in 1954 at the medical department, university of Tübingen, on the interdependence of constitution and environmental influence. He became assistant medical doctor at the psychiatric department of the University Hospital Tübingen and parallel, trained as a psychoanalyst from 1954-60 at Stuttgart, Felix Schottlaender being his training-analyst (Belgrad et al 1989, 11). His first papers were published and after three years working at the Heidelberg clinic for psychosomatic medicine led by Alexander Mitscherlich, Lorenzer joined the Sigmund-Freud-Institut at Frankfurt a.M. in 1963 (Görlich 1996, 619).
A problem already faced in the 1950ties attracted his further interest:

"Although several years of psychiatric work done, I finally left the psychiatric sector and underwent a psychoanalytic training for that science was so utterly at a loss when faced with the main traumata of our times. Eager to find the riddle of the 'traumatic neurosis' being solved in psychoanalysis, I soon encountered a border as well. Here, the insight dawned on me that a solution could only be found in an 'opening up' of psychoanalysis towards Critical Theory." (Lorenzer 1985, 53*)

This became his habilitation project supervised by Alexander Mitscherlich, who at that time had established psychoanalysis at the University of Frankfurt. Finished in 1967 ('The Process of Understanding in Psychoanalytic Operations'), it was submitted during winter semester 1968/69 at the philosophy department of university Frankfurt (published in two parts Lorenzer 1970a, 1970b) (Lorenzer 1970a, 41-42). In cooperation with Heide Berndt and Klaus Horn, a book on psychoanalytic views on architecture and town planning had already been published in 1968 (Lorenzer 1968). From 1971-74 he became professor for social psychology at University Bremen and received a call to Frankfurt in 1974, where he was offered a chair in sociology and was given emeritus status in 1991 (Görlich 1996, 619). During this period, he further elaborated on the theory of socialisation (Lorenzer 1972a, 1973), the second big topic following his theory of symbol (1970b) and psychoanalytic process (1970a, 1974). In a third 'round', Lorenzer developed a methodology of non-medical application of psychoanalysis, beginning with his critic of the reform of the catholic liturgy put forward at the II. Council of the Vatican (Lorenzer 1981b) and leading to analysis of culture (Lorenzer 1986). Until the early 1980ties, Lorenzer worked as a training analyst for DPV. In 1984, his research on the pre-history of psychoanalysis, i.e. mesmerism, hypnotism, Janet, Bernheim, Bertha Pappenheim etc., was published (Lorenzer 1984). In 1991, Lorenzer's fruitful theoretical work came to a tragic end: a heart attack and an undetected accompanying stroke destroyed this unique mind and in total retreat, he lived at Marburg, Germany and later on near Perugia, (Umbria, Italy). Shortly after a conference in honour of his 80th birthday at Frankfurt a.M. in May 2002, Alfred Lorenzer died on 26.06.2002.

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